[HamWAN PSDR] Idea for addressing HTTPS on HamWAN

[Steve Stroh]

I can't speak to the merits of John KX7JM's proposal (but it sounds
ripe for investigation to me).

I've just joined this list, so I haven't seen the previous discussion
making HamWAN not Part 97.

I'd like to throw out, for purposes of discussion, an alternative
approach - request a Special Temporary Authority for "investigating"
the use of https in networks that are to be compliant with Internet
standards and interoperable with the Internet using the Amateur VHF,
UHF, and microwave bands. If it's approved (and if memory serves, they
almost always are, if they're sufficiently bounded; IE not much damage
likely to be caused if the experiment doesn't work) then someone
manages the STA, and as long as your name is listed as one of the
investigators (and it's a formality to add someone), then you're
covered. They get renewed every six months, and sometimes they can run
for years. Eventually you accumulate enough "evidence" supporting, or
disproving, what you're experimenting with, and submit a report, and
usually a recommendation for a rules change.

The rules change requested could be something like:
On Amateur Radio bands > 50 MHz, when using a network that's intended
to be compliant with and interoperable with current Internet
standards, use of Secure Hypertext Protocol (https) is permitted,
provided that the user's intent in using HTTPS is not to obscure
communications. Such usage is typified by a website does not offer the
option of the use of the unencrypted http protocol, only the https
protocol.

That gives the FCC leverage to go after someone they suspect of abuse
by accusing them of intending to obscure communications.

If HamWAN is to be truly useful to served entities in an emergency
(like hospitals, etc.) they're not going to understand why it wouldn't
/ shouldn't work when accessing a website using https (explain this in
excruciating detail).

This proposal would be backed up by listing a number of sites highly
useful to Amateur Radio that you might want to offer only https
access.

This proposed STA might be a great project for HamWAN to apply for a
grant from ARDC to employ some paid legal to form and submit the STA
request to insure that this is done properly so it has a reasonable
change of succeeding.


Thanks,

Steve N8GNJ

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 12:56 PM John C. Miller <kx7jm at jmit.com> wrote:
>
> All,
>
> Apologies for the lengthy post.
>
> I've been mulling over potential solutions for the HTTPS over HamWAN dilemmna:
> Practically universal use of HTTPS web sites + Part 97 makes accessing nearly all web content over HamWAN illegal, and severely limits the utility of HamWAN.
>
> I'm aware of discussions about HamWAN ceasing to be completely P97.  But for as long as HamWAN is even partially subject to P97, I think it's worth looking for solutions or at least work-arounds to P97 limitations.  Thus the subject of this post.  (I also very much hope that sectors are not abandoned in favor of PtP links only!)
>
> From wearing a network security (white) hat I've used certain tools and techniques for network penetration testing that may be helpful to us in this case.  I've just begun testing a methodology for a specialized type of transparent proxy server that should enable some or much of the encrypted content on the web (i.e. https:// sites) to be legally accessed over HamWAN with http. The goal is for this to be essentially transparent to the user, or nearly so.
>
> The short version is that we would deploy a specialized type of transparent web proxy server that splits off the SSL layer from web requests and allows the transaction to flow non-encrypted over HamWAN using http protocol (non-encrypted) which would be Part 97 compliant.  This same server would also circumvent a number of tactics in wide use today that attempt to force web sessions to always use encryption (https).  Implementing such an approach is non-trivial, but I think there is a reasonable chance that it can be done.  There will almost surely be some web sites that won't work well with this strategy, but those will hopefully be relatively few.
>
> A key piece of this strategy uses a network penetration testing tool created in 2009, aptly called SSL-Split.  This program was initially a fairly simple but powerful tool that intercepted secure web sessions (https:) by executing what's known as a man-in-the-middle attack.  Using an attack vector, a server running SSL-Split would insert itself between the person's web browser, and the web server they were accessing.   The attacking SSL-Split server would then strip off the SSL layer, making the payload of "secret" data no longer secret.  At this point the web session would continue un-encrypteed, and user data could simply be captured, or manipulated.  SSL-Split could then re-assemble the SSL layer back onto the data stream on its way to the server.  Neither the web user, nor the web site being visited need be aware of the chicanery going on.
>
> I say that SSL-Split *was* initially fairly simple, because in the 10 years since its creation a variety varied steps have been taken by browser developers and web engineers to force encryption to be used for all web traffic.  But the developers of SSL-Split have evolved the program considerably and have kept pace to a large extent with current technology.  The latest version of SSL-Split is much more powerful than early versions, with the capability of (among other things) essentially creating x.509 security certificates on the fly when needed, refusing certificate revocation status requests, bypassing HSTS, and other tactics that can neutralize the "forced https/encrypted" policies in wide use.
>
> The power of SSL-Split to convert web data streams from http to https and back is a central piece of the strategy that I'm examining.  In the use case for HamWAN, we are using tools like SSL-Split not as an attack weapon, but rather as a data conversion utility. We insert our "conversion server" running SSL-Split and other tools into the appropriate place on the network, and let it do data stream conversion for us.
>
> I've glossed over some of the arcane details of this approach, but this is the basic gist of it.  I'm testing on a private network at home, and packet sniffing the network to confirm that the data stream is indeed un-encrypted where it needs to be.
>
> I'll keep the list apprised of progress.
>
> John Miller, KX7JM
> kx7jm at jmit.com
> (530)873-9005
>
>
>
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-- 
Steve Stroh (personal / general): stevestroh at gmail.com